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This paper examines the dynamic effects of government outlays on economic 
growth and the unemployment rate. Using vector autoregression and data from twenty 
OECD countries over three recent decades, we found: (1) positive shocks to government 
outlays slow down economic growth and raise the unemployment rate; (2) different types 
of government outlays have different effects on growth and unemployment, with transfers 
and subsidies having a larger effect than government purchases; (3) causality runs one-
way from government outlays to economic growth and the unemployment rate; (4) the 
above results are not sensitive to how government outlays are financed. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
How do increases in government outlays affect the unemployment rate and 
economic growth?   How do these effects differ in the short and long run?   Do the effects 
differ if government outlays are purchases or transfers? Does it matter if outlays are 
financed by debt or taxes?  Different theories provide different predictions to these 
questions.  The New Keynesian model, for example, predicts that the various 
expansionary fiscal policies can raise output and lower unemployment in the short-run.  
In contrast, open-economy models with flexible exchange rates and perfect capital 
mobility cast doubt on the short-run efficacy of expansionary fiscal policies to boost 
output and lower unemployment. 
On a less aggregative level, some government purchases and transfers can be 
growth and employment enhancing (Agell, et al. (1997)). Government spending on 
education and infrastructure can raise labor productivity and complement private 
investment. Military spending can generate technological improvements that enhance 
growth. Clearly, government outlays for public goods such as law enforcement may also 
facilitate growth and development. 
On the other hand, some government outlays and their financing may adversely 
affect employment and economic growth.  Transfer programs such as social security and 
Medicare create social capital and tend to reduce private capital formation (Feldstein 
(1996)). Unemployment insurance and taxation on labor income distort work-leisure 
decisions and raise unemployment rates (Feldstein (1978)). Ill-considered government 
purchases of goods and services may yield little or no tangible employment and growth 
benefits, while adversely affecting employment and growth due to taxation distortions   2 
and borrowing effects.
1  As with so many issues in economics, the question of the impact 
of policy must be answered empirically. 
This paper seeks to shed some light on the dynamic effects of expansionary fiscal 
policies on economic growth and the unemployment rate using data from twenty OECD 
countries over three recent decades. We offer what we believe is a more complete and 
general vector autoregressive model (VAR) than have been used in earlier studies. Our 
main conclusions are: (1) positive shocks to government outlays will slow down 
economic growth and raise the unemployment rate; (2) different types of government 
outlays have different effects on growth and unemployment, with transfers and subsidies 
having a larger effect than government purchases; (3) causality runs one-way from 
government outlays to economic growth and the unemployment rate; (4) the above-
mentioned results are not sensitive to how government outlays are financed. 
The next section reviews the empirical literature. Section 3 sets up our VAR 
models and discusses some methodological issues. Section 4 presents the empirical 
findings. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Empirical Literature 
There is a rich empirical literature on the long-run effects of government outlays 
on economic growth. Using cross-country regressions, some studies found a statistically 
significant negative effect of government outlays on economic growth (e.g., Landau 
(1983), Grier and Tullock (1989), Barro (1991) and Afonso and Furceri (2010)), while 
others do not (e.g., Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Ram (1986) and Lin (1994)). Agell et 
al. (1997) provide a good review of the empirical relationship between economic growth 
                                                 
1 A recent and well publicized proposal for a $250 million “bridge to nowhere” in Alaska is one example.   3 
and government outlays. In contrast, the effects of government outlays on the 
unemployment rate have not received much attention until recently. Abrams (1999) was 
the first to find support for the positive link between a nation’s steady-state 
unemployment rate and its total government outlays. Using an error-correction model, 
Wang and Abrams (2011) also found that the steady-state unemployment rate increases 
with total government outlays. In addition, when government outlays are disaggregated, 
transfers and subsidies are found to have a strong negative impact on the steady-state 
unemployment rate while government purchases of goods and services play no 
significant role.  
Multivariate time series analysis has also been conducted to examine the short-run 
dynamic relationship between government outlays and economic growth and between 
government outlays and the unemployment rate.
2 The literature focuses on the causal 
pattern and impulse response analysis in the context of vector autoregression (VAR). 
Conte and Darrat (1988) and Rao (1989) examined Granger-causal relationship between 
government outlays and economic growth using bivariate VAR models. Conte and Darrat 
(1988) found that total government outlays do not Granger-cause per capita output 
growth in the majority of OECD countries. Rao (1989) found no causal relationship 
between output growth and government purchases in most countries and unidirectional 
                                                 
2 Several studies have examined the short-term and long-term effects of government outlays on output or 
income levels but their empirical results were misinterpreted as the effects of government outlays on 
economic growth. Using VAR modeling, Ramey and Shapiro (1997), Fatas and Milhov (2001), Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2004), Edelberg, et al. (1999), Burnside, et al. (2003) and Tagkalakis (2006) 
examined the dynamic responses of output to a one-time shock to government purchases. Overall, 
government purchases have been found to have an expansive output effect. Ahsan, et al. (1996), Ghali 
(1998) and Loizides and Vamvoukas (2005) used cointegrating techniques and found positive long-run 
relationships between output and government outlays. Ghali (1998) also found that government outlays 
Granger-cause output. Others have studied the effect of government outlays on employment. Edelberg, et 
al. (1999) and Fatas and Milhov (2001) found that total private employment rises following a positive 
shock to government purchases. Tagkalakis (2006), on the other hand, found that a positive shock to 
government purchases lowers the employment in the business sector. None of these studies examined the 
effects of transfer outlays.    4 
causation from output growth to government purchases in a few others. Hsieh and Lai 
(1994) estimated a trivariate VAR of government purchases, per capita output growth and 
private investment for the G-7 countries. Their results are mixed. Specifically, there 
appear to be substantial cross-country variations both in the dynamic effects of 
government purchases on growth and in the causal relationship between them. 
Christopoulos and Tsionas (2002) estimated bivariate VAR models for ten OECD 
countries and found that the unemployment rate increases following a positive shock to 
total government expenditures. They also found unidirectional Granger causality running 
from total government expenditures to the unemployment rate for most countries.
3  
 
3. VAR Models and Some Methodological Issues 
This paper examines the dynamic effects of government outlays on economic 
growth and the unemployment rate using what we believe is a more complete and general 
VAR model. In this section, we first set up the VAR models and then discuss some 
methodological issues concerning estimation and statistical inference. 
 
3.1. VAR Model Specifications 
                                                 
3 Christopoulos, et al. (2005) conducted panel cointegration tests and concluded that there is a positive 
long-run relationship between total government expenditures and the unemployment rate and that causality 
runs one-way from total government expenditures to the unemployment rate. These conclusions should be 
taken with caution. First, there is no direct link between the presence or lack of cointegration and the 
direction of causality. Secondly, in residual-based cointegration tests such as the panel cointegration tests 
employed in Christopoulos, et al. (2005), alternating the dependent variable in cointegration regression 
often yields conflicting results. In such cases, interpretation of test results can be tricky. In Christopoulos, 
et al. (2005), the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected when the unemployment rate is used as 
the dependent variable in the cointegrating regression, but not so when government size is the dependent 
variable. The inconsistent test results actually imply a lack of cointegration (long-run relationship) between 
government size and the unemployment rate rather than unidirectional causality.   5 
A question that naturally arises in VAR analysis is what variables should be 
included in the system. In principle, the system should include any variable that is 
intimately connected to the variables of interest. Our benchmark specification (Model 1) 
is a standard VAR of the following five variables: total government outlays as a 
percentage of GDP (GO), the short-term nominal interest rate (R), the unemployment rate 
(U), the real per capita GDP growth rate (G_GDP) and the inflation rate (I).
4  Total 
government outlays, a broad measure of government activity, serve as a portmanteau 
variable to measure the combined effects of the outlays-cum-taxation of government 
purchases and transfer programs. The short-term nominal interest rate is included as a 
control for the stance of monetary policy. The unemployment rate, real per capita GDP 
growth rate and inflation rate have been at the center of interest of economic policies 
during our sample period and are therefore expected to be jointly determined. As a matter 
of fact, since the early 1970s, most OECD countries have witnessed rising unemployment 
rates and slower economic growth accompanied by periodic bouts of strong inflationary 
pressures. 
The use of an aggregative variable such as GO is consistent with reduced-form 
models of unemployment. However, economic theory often predicts that government 
purchases have different effects than transfers since only the former has direct impact on 
the use of resources. To see if there is any empirical support for this prediction, we 
experiment by disaggregating GO into transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 
(TR) and government purchases of goods and services as a percentage of GDP (G). This 
results in Model 2, a 6-equation VAR consisting of TR, G, R, U, G_GDP and I.  
                                                 
4 Variable definitions and sources are given in the Appendix.   6 
To see if our findings are sensitive to how government outlays are financed, we 
experiment with some tax variables.
5 Model 3 is a 6-equation VAR obtained by adding 
total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP (TAX) to Model 1, while Model 4 is a 7-
equation VAR obtained by adding net taxes as a percentage of GDP (TAX_NET) to 
Model 2.  
Besides the above-mentioned joint dependent variables, several exogenous factors 
are also expected to affect growth and unemployment. For example, tight labor market 
regulations and adverse economic shocks are often argued to be responsible for the high 
unemployment rates in the OECD countries since the 1970s. Changes in demographics 
also have the potential to affect the unemployment rate. Globalization may also affect the 
unemployment rate since higher globalization and higher competition in the goods 
markets will lead to a more turbulent environment, with more job destruction and job 
creation (Rodrik (1998)). To accommodate these factors, we include the following 
exogenous variables in each VAR model specification: minimum wage (MIN_WAGE), 
trade union density rate (UNION) and the unemployment benefits replacement rate 
(BENEFITS) for the effects of regulatory and labor-market institutions;
6 oil price shock 
(OIL) for the effects of adverse economic shocks; population growth rate (G_POP) and 
share of female in the labor force (FEMALE) for the effects of demographics; and 
openness (OPEN), measured as the imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP, for the 
effects of globalization. 
                                                 
5 Kneller et al. (1999) examined the relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth in the OECD 
countries. They found that omitting taxes causes the coefficient estimate on government expenditures to 
switch sign. 
6 Other labor-market institutions, such as employment protection legislations, strictness of unemployment 
benefit conditions, active labor market programs and degree of coordination in collective bargaining, have 
also been shown to have significant impacts on the unemployment rate. See Elmeskow et al. (1998), 
Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000), Nickell et al. (2005), Belot and van Ours (2004), Botero et al. (2004). 
They are not included in this study due to lack of time series data for the sample period.   7 
Compared to the previous VAR studies, our model has the following features: (1) 
it models economic growth and the unemployment rate jointly while previous studies 
have focused on one or the other; (2) it examines the potentially different effects of 
transfers and government purchases while previous studies have examined either total 
government outlays or government purchases alone; (3) it explicitly controls for the 
stance of monetary policy and various exogenous factors; (4) it allows us to study the 
relevance of government financing for growth and unemployment. Our VAR models are 
therefore more complete and general than those adopted in the earlier studies. This is 
particularly important for the Granger causality test because inadequately specified 
systems are subject to the omitted variable bias, resulting in spurious causality (Granger 
(1969)). 
 
3.2. Some Methodological Issues 
In VAR analysis, it is often difficult to interpret the coefficient estimates because 
the error terms tend to be contemporaneously correlated and the estimated coefficients on 
successive lags often switch in signs. We therefore follow the standard practice and use 
the impulse response functions (IRFs) to examine the dynamic effects of a one-time 
shock to government outlays. We also investigate the causal relationship between 
government outlays and the unemployment rate and between government outlays and 
economic growth using pair-wise Granger causality tests.  
In section 4, Models 1-4 are estimated by following the lag-augmented VAR (LA-
VAR) procedure proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). We choose to use the LA-
VAR for the following reasons. First, for Granger causality test Wald statistics based on   8 
the LA-VAR estimates has the chi-square limiting distribution regardless of the number 
and location of unit roots.
7 Secondly, the LA-VAR procedure is not sensitive to the 
presence of cointegration. Since the focus of this study is on the impulse response 
functions and Granger causality tests rather than cointegrating relationship, the LA-VAR 
procedure saves us the trouble of pretesting the rank of cointegration or estimating the 
cointegration vectors. It is well known that tests for the rank of cointegration tend to 
suffer size distortion and low power in finite sample. Third, the LA-VAR procedure 
works even when the joint dependent variables are of different orders of integration. The 
procedure can be easily implemented as long as the maximum order of integration is 
known among the joint dependent variables. This feature comes in handy when the unit 
root test statistic is close to the critical value or different unit root tests give conflicting 
results.
8 Forth, LA-VAR is fully parametric and therefore tends to be more stable than 
semiparametric estimators for small and moderate sample. Yamada and Toda (1998) 
conducted extensive Monte Carlo simulations and found that in terms of the Granger 
causality test Wald statistics based on LA-VAR estimates has good size and power 
properties for small and moderate sample sizes. 
For the impulse response analysis, previous studies (e.g. Christopoulos (2002)) 
have reported the orthogonalized impulse response functions (IRFs), which by 
construction depend on the order in which the variables are arranged in the VAR and are 
therefore not unique unless the VAR error terms are uncorrelated across equations. The 
orthogonalized IRFs do not seem appropriate for our study for two reasons. First, for 
                                                 
7 Toda and Yamamoto (1995) showed that if a VAR model contains unit root processes, the OLS based 
Wald statistics for Granger causality test in general do not have the chi-square limiting distribution.  
8 The panel unit root tests in Table 1 suggest that variables in our VAR models are of different orders of 
integration. In particular, some variables are found to be I(1), others stationary, while the tests are not 
unanimous for the remaining variables.   9 
macroeconomic time series, variables included in a VAR model are expected to be 
closely related to one another, the error terms are therefore unlikely to be orthogonal. 
Secondly, in computing the orthogonalized IRFs choosing a particular ordering of the 
joint dependent variables is equivalent to imposing a recursive structure on the VAR 
errors. For example, consider a bivariate VAR of government outlays and the 
unemployment rate. If government outlays are ordered first, then the orthogonalized IRFs 
are computed assuming that government outlays do not respond to contemporaneous 
unemployment shock but unemployment rate does respond to contemporaneous outlay 
shock. These assumptions can be quite restrictive for annual data. In contrast, the 
generalized IRFs proposed by Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) are not sensitive to the 
ordering of the variables or the VAR error structure. Since there is no prior reason to 
choose one particular ordering over another in any of our VAR models, section 4 reports 
the generalized IRFs.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
Our empirical analysis is based on a panel of twenty OECD countries from 1970 
to 1999.
9 We focus on the OECD countries because their data are of high quality and 
highly compatible across country. Our sample ends in 1999, which coincides with the 
introduction of the euro. Combining the pre-euro and post-euro periods will no doubt 
increase the sample size and make this study appear more up to date. But it will also 
                                                 
9 Countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
United States. Data for Germany includes only West Germany prior to merger with East Germany.    10 
subject our estimation results to the complications of a structural break.
10 Therefore, 
instead of taking up the ambitious task of investigating the dynamic effects of 
government size in the midst of a major structural break, we content ourselves with 
focusing on the pre-euro period. 
As a preliminary step, we test each joint dependent variable for the presence of 
unit root. Table 1 reports the results from four panel unit root tests: Levin, Lin and Chu 
(2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Fisher-ADF test by Maddala and Wu (1999) and 
Fisher-PP test by Choi (2001).
11 These tests have been shown to give higher power than 
unit root tests based on individual time series.  All the tests suggest that I is a unit root 
process for all the countries. For GO and G_GDP, the LLC test concludes that they are 
stationary for all the countries while the other three tests suggest that they are stationary 
for at least a subgroup of the countries.
12 Test results are, unfortunately, not unanimous 
for TR, G, TAX, TAX_NET, R and U. It may appear that the results from the panel unit 
root tests are mixed and uninformative. But they lead to the important observation that 
the joint dependent variables in our VAR models are likely to be of different orders of 
integration. Therefore, as discussed in section 3, it is advantageous to use the LA-VAR 
estimates to construct the Wald statistics for Granger causality test. 
13 
                                                 
10 Including a year dummy to control for the EMU structural break is easy to implement. However, this 
approach is, in our opinion, naïve and inadequate. The growth and unemployment dynamics are likely to be 
dramatically different in the euro zone due to its single monetary policy and stringent fiscal policy rules. As 
a result, it may be necessary to set up a separate model for the EMU members in the post-euro period.                                      
11 Since all of the joint dependent variables are expressed in relative terms or as percentage changes and 
none of them displays a deterministic trend, we include a constant but no time trend in the panel unit root 
tests. 
12 Although the panel unit root tests reported in Table 1 share the same null hypothesis that there is a unit 
root for all cross-sections, they differ in the alternative hypothesis. Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) specifies that 
none of the cross-sections has a unit root under the alternative,  while the other three tests require only a 
non-zero fraction of the cross-sections to have  no unit root under the alternative. 
13 We also apply the panel unit root tests to the first difference of each joint dependent variable. The unit 
root null is soundly rejected in all cases. So to apply the LA-VAR procedure, the maximum order of 
integration is set to 1.   11 
Given the dimensions of our VAR models and the limited number of observations 
for each country, country-by-country estimation is unlikely to yield accurate estimates. 
Therefore, we use pooled estimation while including country dummies to control for 
unobserved country characteristics. The lag order in each model is set to 2 according to 
the Akaike information criterion. This is consistent with the view that fiscal and monetary 
policies do not have direct economic impact for more than two years.  
 
4.1. Impulse Response Analysis 
Figure 1 plots the generalized IRFs of U and G_GDP to a one-time unit shock to 
government outlays.
14 The 95% confidence intervals are marked by the dotted lines. The 
first row gives the responses of U and G_GDP to a GO shock based on the estimates of 
model 1. The unemployment rate rises upon impact by 0.09 percentage point. The 
response of U gains strength at first and then weakens gradually with a maximum 
increase of 0.21 percentage point achieved two years after the shock. It stays positive and 
significant until six years after the shock. The real per capita GDP growth rate falls upon 
impact by 0.30 percentage points. The response of G_GDP is less persistent. It stays 
negative and significant for only two years after the shock.  
The second row of Figure 1 gives the responses of U and G_GDP to a TR shock 
and the third row gives the responses of U and G_GDP to a G shock, all of which are 
based on the estimates of model 2. These IRFs display the same patterns as those based 
on model 1. However, compared to a GO shock, the responses of U and G_GDP to a TR 
shock are much stronger while their responses to a G shock are weaker. Following a one-
                                                 
14 A unit shock to GO is a one point increase in GO in the current period, e.g., total government outlays 
increase from 20 to 21 percent of GDP. A unit shock to TR or G is defined similarly.   12 
time unit shock to TR, the unemployment rate rises upon impact by 0.14 percentage 
points and reaches a peak two years later with an increase of 0.35 percentage point. Real 
per capita GDP growth rate falls upon impact by 0.48 percentage points. In contrast, 
following a one-time unit shock to G, the unemployment rate rises upon impact by only 
0.05 percentage points and the peak increase is merely 0.1 percentage points. The real per 
capita GDP growth rate falls upon impact by only 0.17 percentage points.  
 
4.2. Granger Causality 
Table 2 reports the Wald statistics for pair-wise Granger causality tests. In both 
models 1 and 2, we found evidence of unidirectional causality from the government size 
variables to growth and the unemployment rate. In model 1, total government outlays are 
found to Granger-cause both the unemployment rate and real per capita GDP growth. The 
Wald statistics are significant at 10% and 1% level, respectively. In model 2, transfers are 
found to Granger-cause both the unemployment rate and real per capita GDP growth at 
10% and 5% significance level, respectively, while government purchases Granger-cause 
only the real per capita GDP growth, significant at 1% level. 
The lack of causation from G to U and the weak evidence of causality from GO to 
U may seem contradictory to the findings of the impulse response analysis. This can be 
explained by the fact that impulse response analysis makes use of all the coefficient 
estimates in the VAR system plus the estimated error correlation, while the pair-wise 
Granger causality tests are based on only a subset of the coefficient estimates in a 
particular equation. Therefore, impulse response analysis and pair-wise Granger causality 
tests can and in many cases will yield different results. In such cases, the impulse   13 
response analysis tends to be more informative and the results from pair-wise Granger 
causality tests should be interpreted with caution. For instance, when pair-wise Granger 
causality tests fail to find causal relationship from G to U, we can only conclude that 
lagged values of G have no direct impact on the current U. However, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that G might affect U through a third variable. As a matter of fact, both 
GO and G are found to Granger-cause G_GDP which in turn is found to Granger-cause 
U. Therefore, GO and G have indirect impacts on U through G_GDP, which are not 
detected by the pair-wise Granger causality tests. These observations also point to one of 
the strength of our VAR model specifications, i.e., modeling economic growth and the 
unemployment rate jointly allows richer dynamics and offer more insights than modeling 
one at a time as was done in the previous studies. 
 
4.3. Relevance of Government Financing Procedures 
To see if our findings are sensitive to how government outlays are financed, we 
compare the estimation results of models 3 and 4 to those of models 1 and 2, respectively. 
In Figure 1, the IRFs based on models 3 and 4 display the same pattern as those based on 
models 1 and 2 in terms of the signs and magnitudes. The Granger-causality tests based 
on models 3 and 4 also yield the similar conclusions as those based on models 1 and 2. 
The only exception is that the unidirectional causality from government outlays and 
transfers to the unemployment rate is no longer significant at 10% level. In addition, we 
find that tax variables (TAX in model 3 and TAX_NET in model 4) do not Granger-
cause U or G_GDP. Therefore, the effects of government outlays on growth and 
unemployment do not seem to depend on whether outlays are financed through   14 
borrowing or taxation, suggesting Ricardian equivalence (i.e., borrowing and taxation 
produce equivalent macroeconomic effects). 
 
4.4. Role of Exogenous Variables 
Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates on the exogenous variables in the growth 
and unemployment equations.
15 Most of the exogenous variables are insignificant in both 
equations except that share of females in the labor force appears to hamper economic 
growth.
16 Some labor-market institutions are also found to have indirect effects on 
growth and unemployment through government outlays. For example, unemployment 
benefits are found to increase total government outlays and transfers. These findings are 
consistent with the common argument that labor market rigidities are responsible for the 
high unemployment rates in the OECD countries. 
 
4.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
To see if the parameters are stable across countries, we re-estimate the models 
using two sub-samples. First, Spain and Japan represent potential outliers in our sample. 
Almost all of Japan’s dramatic growth in government outlays over the period was in the 
form of government purchases, while Spain’s was in transfers and subsidies. Meanwhile, 
Spain’s unemployment rate rose dramatically while Japan’s increased little. To see if our 
findings that transfers have a stronger effect than government purchases are driven by 
these two countries, we drop Spain and Japan from the sample and re-estimate the 
                                                 
15 To conserve space, coefficient estimates for other equations are not reported here. They are available 
upon request. 
16 We have no prior expectation for the coefficient on the share of females in the labor force. The variable 
may be capturing the effects of some demographic or cultural factor that is not included in the model and, 
as we note in the sensitivity analysis, may be endogenously determined.    15 
models. Secondly, economic growth and unemployment rates in the European and non-
European countries may have followed different dynamics. Therefore, we re-estimate the 
models using data from the 16 OECD-European countries. In both cases, the results are 
very close to full sample estimates.  
We also experimented by dropping the exogenous variables from the models. This 
is due to the concern that variables such as labor institutions may in fact be endogenously 
determined. The results hardly change. Our empirical findings therefore seem to be quite 
robust to changes in samples and the exogenous variables. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  This paper examines the dynamic effects of government outlays on economic 
growth and the unemployment rate using data from twenty OECD countries for the 
period 1970-1999. Our findings are broadly consistent with those in Christopoulos and 
Tsionas (2002) and Wang and Abrams (2011) but contrary to those in Conte and Darrat 
(1988) and Rao (1989). However, by modeling growth and unemployment jointly and 
disaggregating total government outlays into purchases and transfers, our VAR models 
are more general and offer more insights. We find that increases in government outlays 
hamper economic growth and raise the unemployment rate. Moreover, different types of 
government outlays are found to have different effects on growth and unemployment, 
with transfers and subsidies having a larger effect than government purchases. In 
addition, Granger causality tests suggest unidirectional causation from government 
outlays to economic growth and the unemployment rate. Importantly, the estimated 
effects of government outlays on growth and unemployment do not seem to vary with   16 
government financing procedures. Since our empirical analysis is based on the LA-VAR 
estimates, our findings are robust to the presence of unit roots and cointegration, which 
are common in macroeconomic time series.  
This study is a timely one. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 provided for $787 billion in fiscal stimulus that combined both boosts in spending 
and transfers and cuts in taxes. Clearly, the designers of the Act expected that 
expansionary fiscal policy would raise output and lower unemployment, at least in the 
short run. Our empirical findings, however, suggest the opposite. Of the $787 billions, 
roughly $500 billions are increases in government outlays, which amount to 3.55% of 
2009 GDP. According to our estimates
17, as a result of the ARRA, the U.S. 
unemployment rate is expected to increase by 0.3 percentage point (0.09*3.35) in 2009 
and by 0.7 percentage point (0.21*3.35) in 2011. The negative effect on employment is 
expected to last until 2014. The U.S. growth rate is expected to fall by roughly 1 
percentage point (0.30*3.55) in 2009 but the negative effect should die out by 2011.  
Our estimates are diametrical to the estimates of the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO). For example, according to CBO (2011), ARRA is estimated to have raised real 
GDP by 1.1~1.3 percent and have lowered the unemployment rate by 0.7~1.9 percentage 
point in the fourth quarter of 2010.
 The discrepancy in these estimates is partly due to fact 
that our estimates are based on a fiscal shock alone while the CBO’s estimates are 
reflective of joint fiscal and monetary stimulus. Specifically, our VAR model assumes 
that short-term interest rates are fully responsive to fiscal stimulus. As a result of ARRA, 
higher interest rates would crowd out private investment spending and spending on 
                                                 
17 The numbers in this paragraph are based on the estimated impulse response functions of our benchmark 
specification (model 1). To simplify the calculation, we treat the $500 billion increase in outlays as a one-
time shock in year 2009.    17 
durable goods. In contrast, the CBO’s estimates are obtained by holding the short-term 
interest rates very low. As acknowledged  in the CBO report, “Under more normal 
economic conditions, higher interest rates would offset roughly two-third of the 
cumulative impact of stimulative policies on gross domestic product over two years.”
 18  
It should also be noted that the ARRA’s outlays and tax cuts were financed by 
public borrowing. The $787 billion in fiscal stimulus amounts to roughly 5.6% of 2009 
GDP. Several recent studies suggest that the recent run-up in the U.S. public debt may 
lower economic growth in the long run. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) conclude that 
“normal” levels of debt seem to have little or no effect on economic growth but public 
debt can reach a tipping point beyond which more debt lowers a country’s economic 
growth. They estimate the tipping point to be a debt/GDP ratio of 90 percent. Kumar and 
Woo (2010) also find empirical support for an inverse relationship between initial public 
debt and subsequent economic growth. Caner, et al. (2010) observe that the tipping point 
might be as low as a debt/GDP ratio of 77 percent. With a debt/GDP ratio of 83.5 percent 
in 2009 and 89.9 percent in 2010, the U.S. is fast approaching or has already exceeded 
the tipping point.
 19 Therefore, we have reason to believe that the fiscal stimulus provided 
by ARRA may have negative macroeconomic effects, both in the short run and in the 
long run. 
                                                 
18 In estimating the magnitude of the ARRA effects, CBO grouped the spending and tax provisions into 
several general categories and used evidence from various economic models and historical relationships to 
determine the estimated multiplier for each category. It is acknowledged that CBO altered the models’ 
usual formation to reduce the extent to which interest rate respond to increases in output and that the 
estimated multipliers would be reduced by two-third by the end of 2013, when monetary policy is assumed 
to be fully responsive to fiscal stimulus. 
19 The U.S. debt/GDP ratio refers to gross central government debt as a percentage of GDP. They are 
available at http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar/Courses.html. The same measure is used by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010). The debt/GDP ratio in Caner, et al. (2010) is measured as gross general government debt as 
a percentage of GDP.   18 
Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources 
U: Unemployment as a percentage of total labor force. Source: OECD Historical 
Statistics, various issues. 
G_GDP: Annual percentage change in real per capita GDP measured in U.S. dollar. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004). 
I: CPI-based inflation rate. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004). 
GO: Total outlays of government as a percentage of GDP. Source: OECD Historical 
Statistics, various issues. 
TR: Government subsidies and other current transfers as a percentage of GDP. Source: 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004). 
R: Nominal money market interest rate is used for all countries except Greece. For 
Greece, data on the money market rate is very limited, so 12-month T-bill rate is used 
instead. Source: International Financial Statistics. 
TAX: Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP. Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators (2004). 
TAX_NET: Total tax revenue minus transfers as a percentage of GDP. Source: World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (2004). 
MIN_WAGE: Statutory minimum wage as a percentage of median wage. Source: OECD 
Labour Market Statistics (2001). 
UNION: Trade union members as a percentage of all wage and salary earners. Source: 
OECD Labour Market Statistics (2001). 
BENEFITS: Gross unemployment benefits as a percentage of the previous gross wage 
earnings. Source: OECD Labour Market Statistics (2001).   19 
OIL: Oil price shock measured as percentage change in world oil price. Source: World 
Bank, World Development Indicators (2004). 
G_POP: Population growth rate. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(2004). 
FEMALE: Female labor force as a percentage of total labor force. Source: World Bank, 
World Development Indicators (2004). 
OPEN: Imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP. Source: Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf 
(2002). 
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Figure 1: Dynamic responses to a one-time unit shock to government outlays 
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Table 1: Panel Unit Root Tests
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Notes: Numbers in parentheses are p-values. 
a Lag orders used in tests are selected according to the Akaike Information criterion (AIC). 
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Table 2: Pair-wise Granger causality tests 
 
Model 1  Dependent Variable 
  GO  R  U  G_GDP  I 
GO  ---  1.24  5.26*  16.32***  14.07*** 
R  20.82***  ---  69.90***  77.39***  9.47*** 
U  .57  1.36  ---  2.06  3.92 
G_GDP  1.52  12.00***  39.07***  ---  14.41*** 
I  .16  16.09***  4.64*  7.73**  --- 
 
Model 2  Dependent Variable 
  TR  G  R  U  G_GDP  I 
TR  ---  3.41  .42  5.43*  7.46**  6.38** 
G  .87  ---  1.85  2.24  13.17***  10.57*** 
R  11.83***  3.60  ---  56.89***  68.92***  10.36*** 
U  .001  .19  1.72  ---  1.94  3.97 
G_GDP  2.12  .52  10.16***  33.97***  ---  15.54*** 
I  .94  .78  14.97***  4.08  7.37**  --- 
 
Model 3  Dependent Variable 
  GO  TAX  R  U  G_GDP  I 
GO  ---  4.84*  1.22  4.19  16.12***  10.64*** 
TAX  1.32  ---  2.65  .83  2.05  8.44** 
R  14.20***  2.81  ---  56.56***  60.87***  8.89** 
U  .47  .25  1.61  ---  2.19  4.63* 
G_GDP  1.99  7.04**  12.85***  37.32***  ---  11.83*** 
I  1.37  .50  23.42***  3.69  8.24**  --- 
 
Model 4  Dependent Variable 
  TR  G  TAX_NET  R  U  G_GDP  I 
TR  ---  1.63  3.78  1.80  3.16  6.87**  7.20** 
G  1.74  ---  5.41*  1.49  2.24  14.87***  8.51** 
TAX_NET  5.64*  1.54  ---  1.65  .15  1.73  11.55*** 
R  9.85***  3.99  12.25***  ---  54.34***  61.56***  8.89** 
U  .15  .29  .30  1.94  ---  1.32  5.27* 
G_GDP  1.66  .47  10.81***  10.61***  33.30***  ---  13.77*** 
I  2.20  .40  1.69  18.84***  3.70  9.46***  --- 
 
Notes: The pair-wise Granger causality test has a limiting chi-squared distribution with 2 degrees of 
freedom. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 3: Coefficient estimates on the exogenous variables 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
  U  G_GDP  U  G_GDP  U  G_GDP  U  G_GDP 
















































































































Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
 
 